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CASE COMMENTS
MUNICIPALITIES HELD STRICTLY LIABLE UNDER SECTION 1983
Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622 (1980)
The United States Supreme Court in Owen v. City of Independence1
settled the issue of good faith immunity for municipalities under sec-
tion 1983 of the Civil Rights Act by ruling that a municipality is strictly
liable for prohibitory acts that reflect official policy.
The former police chief of Independence, Missouri, alleged that the
city manager discharged him without notice of the reasons and without
a hearing in violation of his substantive and procedural due process
rights under the fourteenth amendment. 2 The police chief instituted an
action under section 1983 of the Civil Rights Act3 against the city, city
manager, and members of the city council in their official capacities.
The district court entered judgment for defendants.4 On remand from
the Supreme Court, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals held that all
defendants, including the city, were entitled to qualified immunity
from liability based on the good faith of the city officials involved.' On
final review, the Supreme Court reversed and held: A municipality
may not assert the good faith of its officials as a defense to liability
I. Judgment entered for defendants, 421 F. Supp. 1110 (W.D. Mo. 1976), ad in part and
rev'd in part, 560 F.2d 925 (8th Cir. 1977), vacated and remanded for consideration in light of
Monell v. Department of Social Servs., 438 U.S. 902, afd on rehearing, 589 F.2d 335 (8th Cir.
1978), rev'd, 445 U.S. 622 (1980).
2. "Due process requires a hearing on the discharge of a government employee 'if the em-
ployer creates and disseminates a false and defamatory impression about the employee in connec-
tion with his termination .... '" Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 661 (1980)
(Powell, J., dissenting) (quoting Codd v. Velger, 429 U.S. 624, 628 (1977) (per curiam)). The
Court first announced this principle in Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972), decided ten
weeks after Owen's discharge. 445 U.S. at 661.
The day prior to petitioner's discharge, the City Council of Independence released a statement
to the news media directing the City Manager to "take all direct and appropriate action" against
those persons "involved in illegal, wrongful, or gross inefficient activities" brought out in an inves-
tigation of the police department. 445 U.S. at 628-29.
3. Enacted as Section 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976) provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of
any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States
or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges,
or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured
in an action of law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
4. 421 F. Supp. at 1126-27.
5. 589 F.2d at 337-38.
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under section 1983.6
Congress enacted section 1983 of the Civil Rights Act to provide a
federal statutory remedy for persons deprived of any "rights, privileges,
or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws. ... 7 Potential
defendants under section 1983 include "every person" responsible for
depriving any person of a protected right while acting under color of
any "statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or
Territory. ... I In short, Congress designed section 1983 as a vehicle
to enforce, and to remedy violations of the fourteenth amendment.
The issue of municipal9 liability under section 1983 has generated
considerable controversy since it first arose in Monroe v. Pape." The
Monroe Court completely immunized municipalities from section 1983
liability by holding that the term "person" as incorporated within the
statute did not include municipalities." The Court reasoned that Con-
gress in 1871 intended to exclude municipal bodies from the class of
persons subject to section 1983.12 The Civil Rights Commission and
6. 445 U.S. at 638.
7. See note 3 supra.
8. Id
9. The term "municipality" refers to any local governmental unit that, under Monroe v.
Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961), was absolutely immune from section 1983 liability and that, after
Monell, retains that immunity with respect to section 1983 claims based on respondeat superior.
10. 365 U.S. 167 (1961). The complaint in Monroe alleged that thirteen Chicago police of-
ficers broke into petitioners' home in the early morning, routed them from bed, made them stand
naked in the living room, and ransacked every room, emptying drawers and ripping mattress
covers. Police then took Mr. Monroe to the police station and detained him on "open" charges for
ten hours, without access to an available magistrate and without permission to call his family or
attorney. He was eventually released without being charged. Id at 169.
11. Id at 187.
12. In its analysis the Court stressed the congressional debates surrounding the Sherman
amendment. This amendment, as originally proposed, would have held a municipal cor-
poration liable for damages to the person or property of its inhabitants by private per-
sons "riotously and tumultuously assembled." Although the proposed Sherman
amendment did not amend section 1 of the 1871 Act, it was the only place where munici-
pal liability was expressly raised. Thus Justice Douglas concluded in his opinion for the
Court that "[the response of the Congress to the proposal to make municipalities liable
for certain actions. . . was so antagonistic that we cannot believe that the word 'person'
was used 'inthis particular Act to include them."
Comment, Monell v. Department of Social Services: One Step Forward and a HalfStep Backfr
Municipal Liability Under Section 1983, 7 HoFsTRA L. REv. 893, 896-97 (1979) (footnotes omit-
ted).
For an analysis of the Monroe Court's interpretation of the legislative history see Kates &
Kouba, Liability o/Public Entities Under Section 1983 ofthe Civil Rights Act, 45 S. CAL. L. REv.
131, 132-36 (1972); Note, A Municipality Is A "Person" Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 Where Local Law
HasAbolished Sovereign Immunity, 9 Hous. L. Rv. 587, 592-94 (1972).
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scholars criticized Monroe for leaving the remedy of section 1983 emas-
culated.' 3 In addition, several courts attempted to limit Monroe.' 4 The
different approaches taken by courts led to the development of a doctri-
nal muddle. 5
In Monell v. Department of Social Services'6 the Supreme Court
13. Recognizing Monroe's failure to protect constitutional rights, the United States Commis-
sion on Civil Rights recommended that Congress reverse Monroe by amending section 1983 to
explicitly incorporate local governments. UNITED STATES COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS, LAW
ENFORCEMENT: A REPORT ON EQUAL PROTECTION IN THE SOUTH 179 (1965); UNITED STATES
COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS, 1961 COMM. ON CIVIL RIGHTS REPORT: BOOK V 25 (1961). See
generaly Kates & Kouba, supra note 12; Levin, The Section 1983 Municipal Immunity Doctrine,
65 GEO. L.J. 1483, 1531 (1977); Comment, Toward State and Municipal Liability in Damagesfor
Denial of Racial Equal Protection, 57 CALIF. L. REV. 1142, 1164-69 (1969); Note, Limiting the
Section 1983 Action in the Wake of Monroe v. Pape, 82 HARV. L. REV. 1486, 1506 (1969); Note,
Developing Governmental Liability Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, 55 MINN. L. REV. 1201, 1203-22
(1971); 90 HARV. L. REV. 1133, 1191-97 (1977).
14. Some federal courts limited Monroe by abrogating immunity under state law. See, e.g.,
Carter v. Carlson, 447 F.2d 358, 368-69 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (intent of Congress was not to create
absolute immunity, but to defer to local rules of immunity), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Dis-
trict of Columbia v. Carter, 409 U.S. 418 (1973). See generally Kates & Kouba, supra note 12, at
155-61.
Other federal courts construed Monroe as barring only damage claims and permitting equitable
relief. See, e.g., Garren v. City of Winston-Salem, 439 F.2d 140, 141 (4th Cir. 1971), vacated, 405
U.S. 1052 (1972); Harkless v. Sweeny Independent School Dist., 427 F.2d 319, 321-23 (5th Cir.
1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 991 (1971); Dailey v. City of Lawton, 425 F.2d 1037, 1038-39 (10th
Cir. 1970); Adams v. City of Park Ridge, 293 F.2d 585, 587 (7th Cir. 1961). See generally Note,
Developing Governmental Liability Under 42 U.S.C § 1983, supra note 13, at 1210-14. The
Supreme Court subsequently rejected these theories. See City of Kenosha v. Bruno, 412 U.S. 507,
512-13 (1973) (municipality not a "person" under § 1983 in suit for injunctive relief); Moor v.
County of Alameda, 411 U.S. 693,710 (1973) (county not subject to suit for damages under § 1983
even when state law abrogates immunity). See also Aldinger v. Howard, 427 U.S. 1, 17-18 (1976)
(reaffirming Monroe exclusion of municipalities from scope of § 1983 liability).
15. See generally Comment, supra note 12, at 895-900. Although Monroe held only that
municipal corporations and counties are not "persons" under § 1983, some lower federal courts
subsequently extended the Monroe rationale to bar § 1983 actions against a wide variety of local
government bodies. See, e.g., Stapp v. Avoyelles Parish School Bd., 545 F.2d 527, 531 n.7 (5th
Cir. 1977) (school board); Sethy v. Alameda County Water Dist., 545 F.2d 1157, 1159-60 (9th Cir.
1976) (water district); Skehan v. Board of Trustees, 501 F.2d 31, 44 (3d Cir. 1974) (state college),
vacated on other grounds, 421 U.S. 983 (1975); Dawes v. Philadelphia Gas Comm'n, 421 F. Supp.
806, 818 (E.D. Pa. 1976) (gas commission).
16. 436 U.S. 658 (1978). The Monell plaintiffs, female employees of the Department of So-
cial Services and the Board of Education of New York City, instituted a § 1983 action against the
department and its commissioner, the board and its chancellor, and the city and its mayor, chal-
lenging an official policy of the city as unconstitutional. The policy permitted both the depart-
ment and the board to compel pregnant employees to take unpaid maternity leaves before such
leaves were medically necessary. The district court dismissed the complaint, holding, inter alia,
that Monroe v. Pape precluded recovery against any of the defendants on the basis that Monroe
held that municipalities were not "persons" under § 1983. The Court of Appeals for the Second
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overruled Monroe and subsequent decisions,17 insofar as those cases
held that municipalities and other local governmental units were whol-
ly immune from suit under section 1983. Concluding that Monroe
rested upon an erroneous interpretation of the legislative history of sec-
tion 1983,18 the Court held that municipalities are indeed "persons"
under section 1983.19 Monell emphasized that municipalities, as "per-
sons," are susceptible to suit only if the unconstitutional action is pur-
suant to official municipal "policy or custom."2 In addition, the Court
reaffirmed that municipalities cannot be held liable under section 1983
on a respondeat superior theory.2' The Monell Court reserved decision
on whether local governments, although not entitled to absolute immu-
nity, could invoke some form of qualified immunity.22 Lower federal
courts in post-Monell decisions split on the question of extending quali-
fied immunity to local governments under section 1983.23
Circuit affirmed. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to address the issue of whether local
governmental units are "persons" within the meaning of§ 1983. Id at 660-62. For further discus-
sion of Monell see Schnapper, CivilgRihts Litigation After Monell, 79 COLUM. L. REv. 213 (1979);
Note, Municpal Liability Under Section 1983: The Meaning of "Policy or Custom," 79 COLUM. L.
REV. 304 (1979); Comment, Municpal Liability under Section 1983for Civil Rights Violations after
Monell, 64 IOwA L. REV. 1032 (1979).
17. See generally cases cited in notes 14 and 15 supra.
18. 436 U.S. at 664-90. The Court concluded that Monroe incorrectly equated the part of the
debates that expressed fear that "Congress had no constitutional power to impose any obligation
upon county and town organizations" with a limitation on the "constitutional power ... to im-
pose civil liability on municipalities." Carlisle, Owen v. City of Independence: Toward Construct-
ing a Modelfor Municipal Liability After Monell, 12 Uaa. LAW. 292, 295 (1980) (quoting Monell,
436 U.S. at 664-65). For an exhaustive discussion of Monell's analysis of the legislative history see
Comment, supra note 16, at 902-906.
19. 436 U.S. at 690.
20. Id at 690-91. The Court states that official "policy or custom" is made either by the
body's lawmakers or by those "whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to represent official policy."
Id at 694. For definitional elaboration see Note, supra note 16. Cases subsequent to Monell
illustrate "custom." See, e.g., Mayes v. Elrod, 470 F. Supp. 1188 (N.D. II1. 1979).
21. 436 U.S. at 694 & n.58. UnderMonell, a local government may not be sued under § 1983
for an injury inflicted solely by its employees or agents. Instead, only when municipal "policy or
custom" inflicts the injury is the government as an entity responsible under § 1983. See generally
note 20 supra. For a criticism of Monelrs rejection of respondeat superior see Comment, supra
note 12, at 906-21.
22. 436 U.S. at 701.
23. Compare Bertot v. School Dist. No. 1,613 F.2d 245 (10th Cir. 1979) and Eckerd v. Indian
River School Dist., 475 F. Supp. 1350 (D. DeL 1979), both refusing to extend a qualified immunity
to the governmental entity, with Paxman v. Campbell, 612 F.2d 848 (4th Cir. 1980) (en banc); Sala
v. County of Suffolk, 604 F.2d 207 (2d Cir. 1979); Owen v. City of Independence, 589 F.2d 335
(8th Cir. 1978) and Shuman v. City of Philadelphia, 470 F. Supp. 449 (E.D. Pa. 1979), each ex-
tending a qualified immunity based on "good faith" to the governmental entity.
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In Owen v. Cy of Independence24 the Supreme Court ruled on the
issue of qualified immunity for municipalities left unresolved by Mo-
nell. The Owen Court firmly rejected a construction of section 1983
that would accord municipalities a qualified immunity based on the
good faith of their officials.2 5 Consequently, despite a claim of good
faith, the Court found the city liable for the unconstitutional conduct of
its city council, whose acts were said to "represent official policy. '26
The majority opinion by Justice Brennan summarily dismissed the
reasoning and holding of the appellate court. The lower court had rea-
soned that no section 1983 violation had occurred because at the time
of petitioner's discharge, the Supreme Court had not as yet established
the right to a hearing and notice upon such discharge. 7
Justice Brennan commenced the opinion with an analysis of the stat-
utory language. He reasoned that the language of section 1983 is "ab-
solute,"2" "unqualified," 29 and "admits of no immunities. ' 30  The
Court cited Monell as authority for extending this absolute liability to
municipalities.3 Moreover, the Court suggested that the legislative his-
tory of the Civil Rights Act evinces congressional intent to liberally
construe the statutory provisions. 3
2
Notwithstanding the Court's expansive reading of section 1983 and
its consequent rejection of qualified municipal immunity, Justice Bren-
nan ratified the good faith defense for officials in their individual ca-
pacities.33 Thus, if an official acts in good faith, no danger of personal
liability exists. The Court justified this good faith immunity accorded
officials,34 in contrast to any form of municipal immunity,35 as compat-
24. 445 U.S. 622 (1980).
25. Id at 635-38, 650, 655-56.
26. Id at 633, 657 (quoting Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 694
(1978)).
27. Id at 633 n.13, 634. See note 2 supra.
28. Id at 635.
29. Id
30. Id
31. Id (quoting Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409 (1976)). See Monell v. Department of
Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 683-87 (1978).
32. 445 U.S. at 635.
33. The Court distinguishes the case in which an official is sued in his individual capacity
from the case in which the official is sued in his official capacity as a representative of the govern-
mental unit. In the former case, good faith immunity becomes necessary "to insulate them from
personal liability for damages." In the latter instance, no protection is needed because "any recov-
ery would come from public funds." Id at 638 n.18.
34. Id at 637-38.
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ible with the purposes of section 1983.36 Moreover, Justice Brennan
reasoned that the rationale underlying the immunity of officials in their
individual capacities 37 fails to apply when municipal liability is at
stake.3 8 The Court also indicated that the good faith immunity of offi-
cials "was well established at common law at the time section 1983 was
enacted. 3 9
Further addressing the distinction between municipal and individual
immunity, Justice Brennan noted that at the time section 1983 was en-
acted, common law did not extend "good faith" qualified immunity to
municipalities.4 Furthermore, the Court indicated that when Congress
adopted section 1983, courts did not recognize qualified municipal im-
munity based on the good faith of municipal officers.4 Finally, Justice
Brennan observed that the legislative debates neither recognized quali-
fied municipal immunity as existing at common law nor expressed an
intention to incorporate it into section 1983.42 In short, the Court con-
cluded that nothing in the legislative history or common-law interpre-
tation of section 1983 supported qualified municipal immunity.
The Court further reasoned that qualified municipal immunity con-
travenes the fundamental legislative purpose of section 1983.43 Owen
35. Id at 638-50. The Court concluded that neither history nor policy support a construction
of § 1983 that would justify qualified immunity for municipalities. Id at 638.
36. Id
37. Id at 654 & n.38, 655. The Court concluded that two basic considerations favor immu-
nity from suit for officials:
(I) the injustice, particularly in the absence of bad faith, of subjecting to liability an
officer who is required, by the legal obligations of his position, to exercise discretion; and
(2) the danger that the threat of such liability would deter his willingness to execute his
office with the decisiveness and the judgment required by the public good.
Id at 654 (footnotes omitted). The Court "mentioned a third justification for extending a quali-
fied immunity to public officials: the fear that the threat of personal liability might deter citizens
from holding public office." Id at 654 n.38 (quoting Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 320
(1975)).
38. Id at 653 & n.37, 654-56 & n.41.
39. Id at 638.
40. Id at 640. Justice Brennan emphasized that courts treated municipalities as natural per-
sons "for virtually all purposes of constitutional and statutory analysis." Id at 639. See Monell v.
Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 687-88 (1978). Municipalities, routinely sued in both
federal and state courts, were commonly held liable for personal losses emanating from a wide
variety of official operations, policies, and functions. See 445 U.S. at 639 & n.19, 640 & n.21.
Municipal liability could also result from acts of authorized agents or officers. See id at 640. See
generally 18 E. McQUuLL.N, MUNICIPAL CogRoRAnoNs § 53.02 (3d rev. ed. 1977).
41. 445 U.S. at 641.
42. Id at 643.
43. Id at 650-51.
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holds that section 1983 represents a congressional attempt to "enforce
provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment against those who carry a
badge of authority of a State and represent it in some capacity, whether
they act in accordance with their authority or misuse it."''4 Justice
Brennan concluded that the Court would be "uniquely amiss" if it al-
lowed the very entity against which section 1983 affords protection to
escape punishment for transgressing the rights that entity was meant to
uphold.
In addition, the Court surveyed the policies underlying section 1983.
Justice Brennan urged that the dual purpose of section 1983 to compen-
sate victims and to deter future abuses "compelled" the outcome.45
Justice Brennan observed that Congress enacted section 1983 to com-
pensate victims of abuses of official power;'46 from that presupposition
he reasoned that a municipality that violates a citizen's rights should
provide compensation.47 In strongly endorsing a compensation policy,
the Court advocated the concept of "loss spreading."48 The Court rea-
soned that because the public-at-large enjoys the benefits of govern-
mental activities, it should also bear the costs and risks of governmental
administration.49
The Owen decision places a limit on the parameters of municipal
liability by applying the Monell test of "official policy or custom. '50
The Court assumed that knowledge of potential municipal liability for
injurious conduct, "whether committed in good faith or not, should
create an incentive for officials who may harbor doubts about the law-
fulness of their intended actions to err on the side of protecting citizens'
constitutional rights."'"
Justice Powell, in dissent,52 initially observed that the Court estab-
lished the due process right of a discharged government employee to a
"name clearing" hearing after Owen's discharge.5 3 Thus, the dissent
44. Id
45. Id See note 73 infra.
46. 445 U.S. at 654.
47. Id
48. Id at 655, 657.
49. Id at 655.
50. Id at 657.
51. Id at 651-52.
52. Chief Justice Burger, Justice Stewart, and Justice Rehnquist joined Justice Powell in dis-
sent
53. 445 U.S. at 658, 683 (Powell, J., dissenting). See note 2 supra.
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broadly criticized the majority's formulation of section 1983, reasoning
that it has the effect of sanctioning municipalities for failing to predict
the development of constitutional law.54 Furthermore, Justice Powell
contended that Owens had failed to establish the requisite elements of
the claimed due process violation." The dissent urged that the major-
ity's interpretation contravenes prior decisions under section 1983,56 the
legislative history,5 7 the common law of municipal tort liability,5  and
the current state law governing municipal immunity. 9 Justice Powell
warned that strict liability under section 1983 for municipalities poses a
significant threat to the operation of local governments.6
In two short years, municipalities have traversed from "absolute im-
munity under section 1983 to strict liability.' ' 6 1 This becomes increas-
ingly significant in view of statistics showing that from 1961 to 1977,
the number of suits annually filed in federal courts under civil rights
statutes increased from 296 to 13,113.62 Not only will Owen probably
54. 445 U.S. at 658, 683 (Powell, J., dissenting).
55. Justice Powell argued that Owen failed to display requisite impairment of his reputation
that would require a "name clearing" hearing under the due process clause. Id at 661-64 (Powell,
J., dissenting).
56. Id at 665-67 (Powell, J., dissenting).
57. Id at 670-76 (Powell, J., dissenting).
58. The dissent discussed the two common-law doctrines limiting municipal tort liability-
the governmental-proprietary doctrine and the discretionary/legislative-ministerial principle-as
supporting limited municipal immunity under section 1983. Id at 676-79 (Powell, J., dissenting).
But see note 40 supra. See also 445 U.S. at 665-67 (Powell, J., dissenting). The dissent also
observed that the majority misplaced its reliance on the Thayer principle as supporting strict lia-
bility, noting subsequent judicial limitations of Thayer. Id at 679-80 n. 19 (Powell, J., dissenting).
See note 40 supra.
59. Justice Powell, analogizing to a "good faith" defense against liability for constitutional
torts, noted that 44 states and the District of Columbia provide qualified municipal immunity for
state law torts. 445 U.S. at 680-83 (Powell, J., dissenting).
60. First, Justice Powell expressed concern that excessive judicial intrusion into municipal
decisionmaking processes will unreasonably restrict the ability of municipalities to govern and to
respond to local needs, resulting in "governmental paralysis." Id at 668-69 (Powell, J., dissent-
ing). Second, the dissent postulated that because many municipalities lack the financial resources
to withstand substantial unanticipated liability under section 1983, the impossibility of strict liabil-
ity could result in financial ruin and inability to serve the public. Id at 670 (Powell, J., dissent-
ing).
61. Id at 665 (Powell, J., dissenting).
62. Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 526 (1978) (Rehnquist, J., concurring in part and dis-
senting in part) (citing DIRECTOR OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES
COURTS, ANN. REP. 189, Table 11 (1977); DIRECTOR OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE
UNITED STATES COURTS, ANN. REP. 173, Table 17 (1976)). Estimates reveal that in 1976 approxi-
mately one-third of all private federal cases filed were civil rights suits against state and local
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol59/iss2/7
MUNICIPAL LIABILITY UNDER SECTION 1983
perpetuate or accelerate this trend, but the number of successful suits
brought against local governments appears likely to increase.
The Court's rejection of qualified immunity for municipalities rested
in part on the public policy of "loss spreading."63 The Owen resolution
of municipal liability recognized and appropriately balanced the equi-
ties involved.' In fairness, when a local government is responsible for
a constitutional deprivation, courts should distribute the loss among the
public rather than impose it on the innocent victim.65 The dissent
warned that a "loss spreading" policy will result in fiscal catastrophe.66
The majority, however, diminished this concern by requiring compen-
sation only for injuries directly related to the administration of official
policy or custom. 67  Furthermore, "evidence from jurisdictions in
which immunity has been abolished shows the fears of expense to be
unwarranted. 68
The Court correctly reasoned that the policies of compensation and
deterrence support a rejection of qualified municipal immunity.69 As
Justice Douglas emphasized in Monroe, the availability of a remedy is
vital to the efficacy of section 1983.70 Prior to Owen, many section 1983
violations remained without remedy because the official was either
judgment proof or accorded good faith immunity.71 The imposition of
liability on municipalities by Owen, however, assures compensation for
injury inflicted by official policy.72 Most authorities view municipal li-
ability as prerequisite to effective deterrence; 73 Owen should therefore
officials. P. BATOR, P. MISHKIN, D. SHAPIRO & H. WECHSLER, HART & WECHSLER'S THE FED-
EkAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 149 (2d ed. Supp. 1977).
63. 445 U.S. at 650-58.
64. Id at 657.
65. Id at 652-53, 657; Kates & Kouba, supra note 12, at 138-39. Contra, 445 U.S. at 667-68
(Powell, J., dissenting).
66. 445 U.S. at 670.
67. Id at 657.
68. Kates & Kouba, supra note 12, at 143. See Van Alstyne, Governmental Tort Liability: A
Decade of Change, 1966 U. ILL. L.F. 919, 968-78.
69. 445 U.S. at 650-52.
70. 365 U.S. at 174.
71. See Kates & Kouba, supra note 12, at 136 n.28.
72. 445 U.S. at 657. "[Mlany victims of municipal malfeasance would be left remediless if
the city were also allowed to assert a good faith defense." Id at 651.
73. See Kates & Koubasupra note 12, at 140-41; Note, Damage.Remedies-4gainst MuniiPal-
tiesfor Constitutional Violations, 89 HARV. L. REV. 922, 927 (1976). The Court postulated three
situations that likely will result in deterrence:
(1) officials who may harbor doubts about the lawfulness of their intended actions will
err on the side of protecting citizens' constitutional rights;
Number 21
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significantly enhance the promotion of deterrence. Owen maximizes
the effectuation of both policies by providing a remedy that does not
relieve municipal officials acting in bad faith of liability, but merely
provides an additional remedy against the local government.
Owen enhances the spirit, purpose, and policies of section 1983.
Nevertheless, the case seems wrongly decided upon the facts. Careful
analysis of the record supports the lower court view that Owen suffered
no constitutional deprivation. Petitioner premised his section 1983
claim on the right to a hearing and notice upon the discharge of a gov-
ernment employee.74 This right was nonexistent, however, at the time
of Owen's discharge. The Court first articulated this right in Board of'
Regents v. Roth,' 5 a case decided ten weeks after his discharge. 76
Clearly, as the appellate court reasoned, this right existed only in the-
ory when the city discharged petitioner.77 As the appellate court con-
cluded, therefore, petitioner had no basis for a section 1983 claim
notwithstanding the Owen doctrine of strict liability.
As Justice Powell observed in the Owen dissent, this aspect of the
decision "unreasonably subjects local governments to damages judg-
ments for actions that were reasonable when performed. It converts
municipal governance into a hazardous slalom through constitutional
obstacles that are often unknown and unknowable. 78 Section 1983
should not be applied so as to charge municipalities with "predicting
the future course of constitutional law."79 By its very terms, section
1983 should apply to protect a right only after such right has been es-
tablished. 0 Nonetheless, the Court's willingness to extend section 1983
(2) policymakers will institute internal rules and programs designed to minimize the
likelihood of unintentional infringements on constitutional rights; and
(3) officials at higher levels will more closely supervise the conduct of subordinates.
445 U.S. at 652.
74. 445 U.S. at 630-31 & n.10.
75. 408 U.S. 564 (1972). See note 2 supra.
.76. See note 2 supra. The Court handed down Roth ten weeks after Owen was discharged
and eight weeks after the city denied his request for a hearing. 445 U.S. at 683 (Powell, J., dissent-
ing).
77. d at 634.
78. Id at 665 (Powell, J., dissenting).
79. Id at 683. "[L]ocal governments and their officials will face the unnerving prospect of
crushing damage judgments whenever a policy valid under current law is later found to be uncon-
stitutional." Id
80. Section 1983 extends protection to "rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Con-
stitution and laws. ... (emphasis added). See note 3 supra.
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to protect undefined constitutional rights should stand as a caveat to
local governments.
Owen v. City of Independence reinforces the obligation of local gov-
ernments to recognize and to protect constitutional rights by providing
a meaningful recourse under section 1983 for victims of municipal
wrongdoings.
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